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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE PROBLEM OF COVERAGE
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance benefit payments and taxes are
based on the workers status. The first requirement for covered em-
ployment is that an employment relation must exist between the worker
and his employer. In addition, the worker must not come within any
of the statutory exceptions in the Act. The first subsection below is
a discussion of the former problem. Subsequent subsections deal with
the more important statutory exceptions.,
EMPLOYMENT
The Act reads "any service performed... by an employee for the
person employing him ... ."2 The exact scope of this term and the
basis to determine when an employment relation exists are not found
in the Social Security Act. But the Bureau of Internal Revenue$ and
the Social Security Board4 have selected the common law control test5
as a basis to determine who are employees.6 The Federal district
2 Exceptions not discussed in this issue are: Family service; service in
connection with a foreign vessel, if employed outside the United
States; service for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-
cational organization, if net earnings do not inure to the benefit
of any private person, and no substantial part is for propaganda
or to influence legislation; certain services as defined in the In-
ternal Revenue Code; service in the employ of a foreign govern-
ment or an instrumentality thereof; service as an interne or stu-
dent nurse; service in connection with the fishing industry; and
service by a person under eighteen in the distribution of news-
papers. 49 STAT. 625 as amended 53 STAT. 1373 (1939), 42 U. S.
C. A. §409 (Supp. 1940).
2 49 STAT. 625 as amended 53 STAT. 1373 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §409 (b)
(Supp. 1940). Employment must be within the United States or in
connection with an American vessel under a contract of service
which is entered into within the United States or during the per-
formance of which the vessel touches at a port in the United States,
if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel
when outside the United States.
5 The Bureau of Internal Revenue determines the tax liability of em-
ployers and employees covered by the Act.
4The Social Security Board is charged with the duty of certifying to
the Treasury for payment Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Benefits to persons who meet the requirements set forth in the Act.
6 The "control test" was first adopted to determine the scope of vicarious
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior and to determine
who were employees under the fellow-servant rule; more recently it
has been used under workmen's compensation and unemployment
compensation legislation. See Stevens, The Test of the Employment
Relation (1939) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 188.
6 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204, and Soc. See. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804 state
the control test as follows: "The relationship of employer and
employee exists when the person for whom the services are per-
formed has the right to control and direct the individual who per-
forms the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by
the work, but also as to the details and means by which that result
(495)
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courts, in the only cases litigated so far, have adopted the same test.7
There is authority, however, that the term employee in the act may
have a more inclusive meaning than the term servant.8 Yet the use
of the control test restricts the scope of employment to the common law
master and servant relation.9 This test has been criticized as irrelevant
in determining who are entitled to old age insurance benefits and as
too narrow for use in social legislation.1o Sound as these criticisms
may be, the control test is at least partially justified. It provides fair
degree of certainty, appreciable standardization, and a high degree of
familiarity to administrators, attorneys and courts.
The control test makes all persons rendering services either in-
dependent contractors or employees. The right to direct the manner,
method and means by which work is done indicates an employee rela-
tion. The lack of such a right, with control only over the result to be
accomplished, establishes an independent contractor relation." The
employer's right to inspect the work during progress does not put
him in control of the independent contractor.' 2
The rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Social
Security Board, based on the regulations,13 are applications of the
control test. They indicate the factual matters the Bureau and Board
consider important in establishing the relation.14 If a person is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and
control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but how
it shall be done. In this connection it is not necessary that the
employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services
are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so."
7See Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 31 F. Supp. 458 (S. D. Inl. 1940)
where the court held that a bulk plant operator was not an em-
ployee of an oil company, but an independent contractor, because
the company "had no control over the means, methods, and details
of operation." The court expressly adopted the common law con-trol test used to determine vicarious liability in Jones v. Stander-
fer, 196 Ill. App. 145, 15 N. E. (2d) 924 (1938) and stated at 460,
"There is nothing in the Social Security Act which suggests that
the terms 'employer' and 'employee' should receive anything but
their ordinary construction"; accord, Barnes v. Indian Refining
Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 5. W. (2d) 620 (1939); Texas Co. v. Higgins,
32 F. Supp. 428 (5. D. N. Y. 1940).
s Buscheck, Life Insurance Solicitors-Employees or Independent Con-
tractors? (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 894; MVcQuade, The Employment
Relationship Under the Federal Social Security Act (1938) 7 Brook-lyn L. Rev. 480.
9 Id. at 482, and cases cited; Buscheck, supra note 8, at 895.
'o Stevens, supra~ note 5.
"Marchand v. Russell, 257 Mich. 96, 100, 241 N. W. 209 (1932); see
note (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 502.
12 Note (1934) 9 nd. L. J. 262, and cases cited.
' s See note 6 supra.
e-4 As a matter of policy, the Bureau of Internal Revenue will not make
blanket rulings in dealing with the Social Security Act, and instead
will in doubtful cases rule on the particular facts of each case.
Note (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 848, citing S. S. T. 4730, 1938-1
cu . 4U2. 404.
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business or profession he is not an employee.1 5 The Bureau has ruled
that a doctor, paid a regular monthly salary for treating a mining
company's injured employees, but who also maintained a private
practice, was not covered 16 An attorney paid a regular retainer to
defend suits to which a certain corporation was a party was not an
employee. 17 But if a person performing services which are usually
professional is subject to complete control he is then an employee. Thus
where a doctor was employed as full time company physician subject
to the company's direction,18 or employed by a clinic and subject to the
control of its owners,' 9 he was held to be an employee. So also a
lawyer working for and controlled by a law firm is an employee of
that firm, not an independent contractor.20 A higher concentration of
control is required, however, to make professional persons "employees."
Where the person for whom services are performed supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and place of work, an employment relation is
created; if, on the other hand, the workman supplies them, that is
evidence that he is not an employee.21 In this connection, the Bureau
attaches importance to whether the employer furnishes the person per-
forming the services with office or desk space, furniture, equipment,
office and agency expenses, forms, stationary, advertising matter, tele-
phone, and transportation or traveling expenses. 22 For example, where
15 "Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors,
subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who
follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they
offer their services to the public, are independent contractors and
not employees." U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. Sec. Ed. Reg.
3, §403.804.
10 S. S. T. 240, 1937-2 cuai. nULL. 403.
'T S. S. T. 86, 1937-1 cum. BULL. 462, which cites Metcalf and Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1925) (consulting engineer held independent
contractor by control test); Blair v. Byers, 35 F. (2d) 326 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929); and Burnet v. McDonough, 46 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A.
8th, 1931) (attorneys rendering professional services for govern-
mental sub-divisions held not employees of such sub-divisions for
purpose of income tax exemptions). See also S. S. T. 212, 1937-2
CUM. BULL. 397; S. S. T. 217, id. at 398; S. S. T. 329, 1938-2 CuM.
BULL. 288; S. S. T. 152, 1937-1 cUm. BULL. 382. Opinion of Counsel,
Soc. Sec. Bd., Nov. 18, 1940, held a professional business- engineer-
ing consultant was not an employee, not being subject to control.
Is S. S. T. 291, 1938-1 cuMi. BULL. 416.
19 S. S. T. 360, 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 291.
20 S. S. T. 271, 1938-1 cUm. BULrL 409. See also S. S. T. 149, 1937-1 cum.
BULL. 380 (auctioneer held employee of firm of auctioneers for
which he worked); compare S. S. T. 392, INT. REV. BULL NO. 24, at
11 (1940) with S. S. T. 391, ibid. In an opinion of Nov. 27, 1940, a
bookkeeper-accountant working for several firms was held an em-
ployee by Soc. See. Ed. Counsel; similarly S. S. T. 373, 1939-2 cum.
BULL. 275 (professional business analyst and consultant held em-
ployee, being subject to control).
21 See U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. Sec. Ed. Reg. 3, §403.804;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §220.
2 2 Information as to these matters is sought in questionnaires which the
Bureau uses to gain specific facts in doubtful cases. See Mim.
4730, 1938-1 cum. BULL. 404; Mim. 4767 (Rev.), 1939-2 CUM. BULL.
276.
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a taxicab company furnished cabs to drivers on a lease plan, paid
upkeep and repair of cabs, and furnished garage space, office, tele-
phone, and an employee to receive calls, the drivers were the com-
pany's employees.23 However, if the person performing the services
supplies the tools and instrumentalities he is not an independent con-
tractor if the employer retains the right to control the manner and
means of performance. Where an individual, under contract with a
cannery to harvest crops, furnished all his own trucks and laborers,
yet was subject to control over the manner, means and place of per-
formance, both he and all his laborers were held employees of the
cannery. 24 But ordinarily if the individual hires his own assistants,
he is an independent contractor.25
The right to discharge a worker is strong evidence of an employer-
employee relationship.26 This right is inconsistent with the status of
the independent contractor.27 Thus, where coal truck drivers furnished
their own trucks and all expenses, the fact that the coal company
could terminate the contract at will without liability made the drivers
employees, not independent contractors. 28 It was likewise held that a
23 S. S. T. 157, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 384. But cf. S. S. T. 241, 1937-2 cum.
BULL. 404, where cab drivers were held not employees of cab as-
sociation which sold the cabs to the drivers on conditional sales
contracts, took telephone orders for a fee, the association furnish-
ing no other equipment or expenses and having no right to control
or discharge. See S. S. T. 197, 1937-2 cuM. BULL. 392; S. S. T. 212,
id. at 397; and S. S. T. 217, id. at 398.
24 S. S. T. 351, 1939-1 cum. BULL. 286. And where a dairy company
required its route drivers to furnish their own trucks, suitable to
the company, and to purchase from the company the milk to be
re-sold to route customers, the fact that the company retained full
control over the manner of performance established an employment
relation. S. S. T. 259, 1938-1 CUM. BULL. 397; accord, Jack and Jill
v. Tone, 126 Conn. 114, 9 A.(2d) 497 (1939) ; Creameries of Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 571, 102 P. (2d) 300 (1940).
See S. S. T. 403, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 42, at 3 (1940) (coal truck
drivers who furnished their own trucks and expenses ruled em-
ployees because subject to control).
23 Lazarus v. Scherer, 92 Ind. App. 90, 174 N. E. (2d) 293 (1930) ; note
(1941) 25 Marq. L. Rev. 109; S. S. T. 360, 1939-1 3um. BULL. 290(foreman of a rather permanently organized sheep-shearing crew
which he furnished on contract with wool growers, held an inde-
pendent contractor and not an employee of the wool growers).
See Beaverdale Memorial Park, Inc. v. Danaher, 15 A. (2d) 17
(Conn. 1940).
26U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804. See
questionnaires, Mim. 4730, 1938-1 CUM. BULL. 404; Mim. 4767
(Rev.), 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 276. See Layman, Distinction Between
Salesmen, Agents, and Independent Contractors (1937) 15 TAX.
MAG. 409; note (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 848. See Schomp v.
Fuller Brush Co., 12 A. (2d) 702 (N. J. 1940).
27 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 (1889); note (1941) 25
Marq. L. Rev. 109; Fidel Association v. Miller, 20 N. Y. Supp. 381(1940) (unemployment compensation case-bond salesman, not con-
trolled as to how he performed, nor subject to discharge for the
way the work was done, not an employee).
28 S. S. T. 403, INT. REV, BULL. NO. 42, at 3 (1940). See S. S. T. 396,
id. No. 30, at 5 (1940); S. S. T. 411, id. No. 10, at 9 (1940); S.
S. T. 350, 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 285; S. S. T. 170, 1937-2 CUM. BULL 382.
498
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doctor who was employed full time but subject to discharge at will,
was an employee.
29
Services performed as a part of the regular business of the em-
ployer tend to establish an employer-employee relation.3 0 Thus the
Bureau has segregated casual labor and employment within the Act on
this basis. 31 State courts and legislatures likewise have made this an
important factor in determining the employment relation under Un-
employment Compensation statutes. 32
The fact that the parties believe they are or are not creating a
master and servant relationship and manifest such an intent is given
little weight.3 3 The use of the terms "independent contractor" or
"employee" in the contract is not determinative if inconsistent with
the actual facts of the case.3 4 The Bureau and Board have similarly
minimized its effect.3 5 Thus, a contract to do the janitor work in an
apartment building, to make minor repairs and furnish materials, and
the worker was expressly designated an independent contractor, not an
employee, evidence that he was reimbursed for all expenses, in addition
to his wages, and that he was subject to control and to discharge on
notice was sufficient to make him an employee.36
The length of time for which the person is employed has some
weight.3 ." If the contract is of short duration and for a specific job
it is less likely that an employment relation will be established than if
the service is to extend over a longer period during which more control
over manner of performance is likely to be exercised.
29 Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., June 24, 1940.
"oRESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220.
31 See subsection on Casual Labor, p. 503 infra.
32This factor is especially important in the type of statutes which as-
sume that all services performed constitute "employment" unless the
employer has no control over the manner and means of performance,
unless the service is outside the usual course and place of the
business for which it is performed, and unless the performer is
engaged in an independently established trade, business, or pro-
fession. Compare Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560 (1939) (decided under the
above type of statute) with Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640, 121 A. L. R. 993 (1939) (de-
cided under regular master and servant test). The former statute
is much more liberal. Note (1934) 9 Ind. L. J. 262, citing Domer
v. Castator, 82 Ind. App. 574, 174 N. E. 517 (1930), a workmen's
compensation case using this factor in holding a carpenter-con-
tractor an employee.
33 Layman, supra note 26, at 439.
,4 See note (1941) 26 Iowa L. Rev. 419; Nesseth v. Skelly Oil Co.,
176 Minn. 273, 223 N. W. 608 (1929); Jack and Jill v. Tone,
126 Conn. 114, 9 A. (2d) 497 (1939) (note how the court goes
behind the terms of the contract to establish an employment re-
lation).
35U. S. Treas. Reg. 106 § 402.204; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804.
3G Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., July 26, 1940.
37Notes (1941) 26 Iowa L. Rev. 419 (1934) 9 Ind. L .J. 262; RESTATE-
MIENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220. See S. S. T. 212, 1937-2 CUM. BULL.
397, and S. S. T. 217 id. at 398.
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The method of payment may be given some consideration. 38
Questionnaires issued by the Bureau indicate that if the pay is by
the job rather than by the hour, or solely by commissions rather than
by wages, that is evidence that the workman is an independent con-
tractor.39 The regulations, however, place this at a minimum saying,
"The measurement, method, or designation of compensation is . . .
immaterial if the relationship of employer and employee in fact exists.140
The nature of the occupation, whether it requires great skill,41
and whether it is usually performed in a particular locality under the
direction of the employer, or by a specialist without supervision, may
be considered in determining the relationship existing in a particular
situation. 42 The degree of control required to establish an employment
relation may thus vary with the character of the occupation. Very
little control can be exercised over the manner in which cab drivers
perform, yet they are generally held to be employees.4 3 So also life
insurance agents and solicitors must operate relatively independently
but may be classed as employees if other factors are present.44
88 Layman, loc. cit. supra note 26; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §220;
S. S. T. 212, 1937-2 CUM. BULL. 397; S. S. T. 217, id. at 398.
3SMim. 4730, 1938-1 CUM. BULL. 404; Mim. 4767 (Rev.), 1939-2 cum.
BULL. 276.
40 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804.
41 S. S. T. 212, 1937-2 cum. BULL. 397; S. S. T. 217, id. at 398;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220. But if subject to sufficient
control, the most skilled workman may be an employee; thus in-
structors in a private law school were employees of that school,
being subject to control and direction, and while teaching, not
practicing an independent profession. S. S. T. 341, 1938-2 cum.
BULL. 297.42 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220; see S. S. T. 344, 1938-2 CUm.
BULL. 299, where agents of a bonding company performed as
specialists without supervision and were therefore independent
contractors.
43 S. S. T. 157, 1937-1 cum. BULL. 384; see Kaus v. Huston, 35 F. Supp.
327 (N. D. Iowa, 1940), where cab drivers who leased cabs from
the company under contracts which revealed little right to con-
trol were held employees. The court said that from the very
nature of the employment the drivers had to exercise very complete
control, but that there was "no discretion vested in the drivers
inconsistent with the relation of master and servant." The court
very practically turned the issue on the fact that it was the com-
pany, not the individual drivers, who operated the "line of taxi-
cabs as a common carrier of passengers."
44 For facts the Bureau considers, see questionnaires on status of life
insurance general agents and subagents, Mim. 4730, 1938-1 cum.
BULL. 404. A ruling written by Morrison Shafroth, formerly Chief
Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, indicates that by the strict
control test soliciting agents will generally be held independent
contractors. G. C. M. 18705, 1937-2 cum. BULL. 379. Cf. Buscheck,
loc. cit. supra note 8. Does this indicate a failure of the control
test as applied by the Bureau to include a large class of employees
who should be covered by the Act? The counsel in G. C. M.
18705, 1937-2 CUM. BULL. 379, cites cases arising under respondeat
superior, holding insurance solicitors not employees: American
Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Replinger, 249 Ky. 8, 60 S. W. (2d)
115 (1933); and Neece v. Lee, 129 Neb. 561, 262 N. W. 1 (1935).
500
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Other information is important in determining the existence of
an employment relation.45 Thus, it is significant that the person must
work certain hours; must canvass a certain route or territory; has
exclusive rights to a territory; must call on customers or prospects as
directed; must keep records and reports; is required to perform other
services, such as collecting accounts, making adjustments, investigating
credit ratings, etc.; is required to attend staff meetings, conferences,
or training schools; must refrain from engaging in other business.
These factors all indicate whether the employer exercises or has the
power to exercise sufficient control to make the performer his employee
under the act.
Certain classes of persons, not ordinarily thought of as independent
contractors, but who are in control of businesses and perform services
therefor, do not fall within the employment relation as contemplated
by the Act. The Bureau has ruled that partners of a bona fide part-
nership, performing services in the regular course of the partnership
business, are not employees of the partnership under the Act.46 But it
must be a true common law partnership, not a "partnership associa-
tion" authorized only by statute.47 Generally it must meet the require-
ments that it be a "voluntary contract of association for the purpose of
sharing the profits, as such, which may arise from the use of labor or
skill in a common enterprise; and an intention of the parties to form
a partnership for that purpose."48 Thus the Board ruled that salesmen
were still employees in spite of a so-called partnership agreement
whereby the employer received 94% of the profits and the three em-
ployees 2% each in form of a base wage, the employer owning all the
capital and retaining virtual exclusive control of the enterprise.49 But
But see the following cases awarding unemployment compensation
to life insurance solicitors as employees: Unemployment Compensa-
tion Comm. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. C. 479,
2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 105 Colo. 144, 95 P. (2d) 4 (1939); Industrial Comm. v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560(1939). But see Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125
Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640, 121 A. L. R. 993 (1939).
41 Questionnaires, Mim. 4730, 1938-1 cuMi. BULL. 404; Mim. 4767 (Rev.),
1939-2 cum. BULL. 276.
46 S. S. T. 23, XV-2 cUM. BULL. 405 (1936).
47 S. S. T. 116, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 374.
48 In re Zeitz, 31 N. E. (2d) 209 (Ind. 1940) (owners of manufactur-
ing corporation entered into "partnership" agreement with em-
ployees, which set up a board consisting of four owners as senior
partners and two representatives of the junior partners, the em-
ployees. The "partnership' leased the equipment and buildings
of the corporation, and the employee-partners were paid an hourly
wage plus 10% of profits. All control of the business remained
in the board, which itself was dominated by the owners of the
corporation. Held, the workers were employees, hence entitled to
unemployment compensation; notes (1939) 37 Mich. L,. Rev. 986,
(1939) 14 St. John's L. Rev. 134. If the employment relation in
fact exists, "It is of no consequence that the employee is designated
as a partner, coadventurer, agent, or independent contractor."
U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. See. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804.
-9 Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., March 22, 1940.
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if the partners are under a contract of employment by which the em-
ployer reserves the right to control and direct the manner and means
of performance, they will be considered as employees.50
Trustees, receivers, guardians, executors, administrators, and
liquidators are not employees under the Act.51 But if they perform
services for the trust, estate, etc., outside the scope of their official
duties, they may be employees for such services. 52
Directors of corporations are not employees as to the services
they perform as directors.53 But a director may be an employee if he
performs services for the corporation other than those required by
attendance at and participation in meetings of the board. 54 Corporate
officers, however, are expressly included as employees.55
Where a person performs service for more than one employer, the
taxable employer is the one who has the right to control the perform-
ance of the work, the right to discharge, and the obligation to pay
for the service.58 Persons rendering services as independent contractors
are generally the employers of the workers they hire to assist them and
over whom they exercise control.57 Persons hired by employees are
employees of the principal employer.58 A person contracting to supply
a group of workmen is usually "middle-man" and the person for whom
services are performed, is the employer.59 If however the first party
retains the right to control the performance of the services, and is not
himself the employee of the second party, he remains the employer under
the Act.60 The distinction is illustrated in the difference between
"non-name" and "name" orchestras. In the former, the leader contracts
with the purchaser of the services to supply a certain number of
musicians, whereupon the purchaser gains the right of control and
discharge and is liable to pay them as individuals or through the
50 S. S. T. 239, 1937-1 cum. BULL. 374.
51 S. S. T, 120, id. at 375; S. S. T. 181, 1937-2 cum. BULL. 387;
S. S. T. 254, 1938-1 cum. BULL. 395.
52 S. S. T. 136, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 377; S. S. T. 254, 1938-1 cum. BULL.
395; S. S. T. 408, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 53, at 15 (1940).
53 S. S. T. 310, 1938-2 CUM. BULL. 284; U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204;
Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804.
54U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.204; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.804.
5
r FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT, INT. REV. CODE §1426 (1939);
26 U. S. C. A. § 1426 (d).
56 S. S. T. 15, XV-2 CUM. BULL. 401 (1936); S. S. T. 370, 1939-2 CUm.
BULL. 274.
57 S. S. T. 17 XV-2 CUM. BULL. 402 (1936); S. S. T. 153, 1937-1 CUm.
BULL. 390.
58 S. S. T. 35, XV-2 CuM. BULL. 407 (1936); S. S. T. 70, 1937-1 Cum.
BULL. 387; S. S. T. 336, 1938-2 cUM. BULL. 295.
595. S. T. 69, 1937-1 CUm. BULL. 386; S. S. T. 260, 1938-1 cUM.
BULL. 399; S. S. T. 333, 1938-2 CUM. BULL. 291; S. S. T. 350,
1939-1 cUM. BULL. 285; S. S. T. 388, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 21, at
194 (1940).
60 S. S. T. 296, 1938-1 cum. BULL. 418; S. S. T. 360, 1939-1 cum. BULL.
290; S. S. T. 377, 1939-2 CUm. BULL. 288.
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leader.61 In the second situation, the leader retains the right to
control and the members of his orchestra are his employees.62
The Bureau has ruled that bankruptcy trustees are employers of
the assistants which they personally hire.63 The officers of a sub-
sidiary corporation were ruled to be its employees although they were
in fact paid by the parent corporation; but accountants controlled by
the parent and rendering services to the subsidiary for a flat fee were
ruled employees of the parent corporation.64
It seems clear from the cases and the rulings that the agency
control test is the primary standard to determine who are employees
within the Act. The other criteria are merely supplementary aids.
There seems no sound reason to disregard common law principles now
being applied in this matter as long as proper emphasis is given to the
character of the legislation and the purpose of Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance.
CASUAL LABOR
Casual labor is occasional labor not in the course of the employer's
trade or business. 65 This exemption is necessary for administrative
convenience and efficiency. 6  The Act attempts to lint the exception by
using the narrowest of the several provisions excepting casual labor
in workmen's compensation statutes. 67 Two requirements are necessary
for exemption: the service of the employee must constitute "casual
labor;" and the se'rvice must not be in the course of the employer's
trade or business.68 The exemption considers the scope of the whole
enterprise for which the service is performed as well as the quantity
of the individual employment.69
61 Mim. 4651, 1937-2 cUM. BULL. 389; S. S. T. 375, 1939-2 CUM. BULL.
280. See In re Rogavin's Claim, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 302; aff'd., 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (1940); Ajello v. Savarin's Management, Inc.,
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 886 (1940).
OSMim. 4651, 1937-2 CUM. BULL. 389; S. S. T. 375, 1939-2 CUM. BULL.
280.
63 S. S. T. 124, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 389; and where an executor hired an
assistant to help him carry out his official duties, the executor,
not the estate, was the employer. S. S. T. 255, 1938-1 cUM. BULL.
396.
6- S. S. T. 154, 1937-1 CUm. BULL. 391.
O49 STAT. 622 (1935) as amended 53 STAT. 1400 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A.
§§409b (3), 1011 (3) (Supp. 1940).
66 Stevens, Coverage of the Old Age Benefit Provisions of the Social
Security Act (Unpublished thesis in University of Michigan Law
Library, 1939) at 56.
67 All "casual labor" is excluded in some states, IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932)
§43-904; in others all services "not in the course of the employer's
trade or business, are excluded, OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937)
§1465-68; a third type excludes "casual labor not in the usual
course of the employer's trade or business," IND. STAT. ANN. (Burnq,
1933) §40-1701(b).
69 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.210; Soc. Sec. Ed. Reg. 3, §403.8101_
Soc. Sec. Ed., Claims Manual (1940) §1203.6D Since a corporation is without legal authority to employ service
which is not in the course of the corporation's business, service
for a corporation is always within the Act. Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims
Manual (1940) §1203 (e); U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.210.
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The Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Social Security Board
have no general rule but only determine when labor is "casual" as
cases arise70 The basic test is that the work must be occasional,
incidental, or irregular.71 In addition to the duration of the service,
actual or expected, the nature of the employment72 as well as the size
of the project73 is considered. Thus "extra-help" employed only when
the business requires additional employees,7 4 a carpenter who worked
for approximately 8 days,7 5 and a yardman who levelled ground and
set out grass,7 6 were held to be "casual laborers." 7 On the other hand
services performed by different carpenters for periods varying from 12
days to two months,78 a three weeks job by a stone mason,7 9 and a
laborer who hauled logs for 28 dayssO were held not within the ex-
ception.
For convenience the agencies use two presumptions to8l determine
whether the services are casual.82 Services to come within the exception
must not be performed on more than ten calendar days, consecutive, or
70 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 12, 1938, at 3.
71 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.210; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.810; Soc.
Sec. Bd. Claims Manual (1940) §1203.
72 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 12, 1938, at 7, 12.
78 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 13.
74 
"Extra" chauffeurs, pall bearers and singers employed by an under-
taker, S. S. T. 178, 1937-2 cuM. BULL. 421; extra-clerks in de-
partment stores, U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.210.
rz Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 13.
76 Id. at 2.
77 Services performed in repairing a private roadway for a "brief
period," Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, at 15, services of a person
hired to paint a house who "just painted as he felt like it,' I&
at 19, and the temporary services -performed by a nurse in a
private home S. S. T. 71, 1937-1 CUM. BUL. 407, were also classified
as "casual" services.
78 One carpenter employed for a 12 day period, Soc. Sec. Bd. Memo-
randum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 27; two carpenters who were to be em-
ployed for about one month, Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 12,
1938, at 9; several carpenters to be employed about 40 or 50 days,
id. at 8; and one carpenter employed for 2 months, Soc. Sec. Bd.
Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 2, 25. A carpenter who worked for
an undetermined length of Lime but who was paid $423 "prob-
ably" was not a casual laborer, the amount indicating that the
services were unlikely to be occasional, incidental or irregular. Id.
at 18.
70 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 12. Similarly services
performed for a five-week period by a repairman was held not
excepted. Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 12, 1938, at 10.
so Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 17. Also a laborer em-
ployed for three months in grading a private roadway was not
within the exception. Id. at 7.
81 These rules were promulgated late in 1938 and appeared after most
of the above-mentioned cases were decided.
82 Mim. 5121, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 45, at 6 (1940); Mii. 4847, 1938-2
cum. BULL. 310; Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 12, 1938, at 11;
Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §1203 (a). It is emphasized
that these are only rules of presumption and may be rebutted by
any employer or employee affected, or by the Bureau or Board.
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otherwise, during a period of one calendar month or any two consecutive
calendar months.83 Service performed on 11 days or more within the
prescribed period is not "casual labor," and all the service, including the
first ten days, is taxable. The duration of the service in any one day
is of no importance.
According to the second presumption, if the total number of hours
of service performed by all individuals on a particular job or project84
is more than 200, none of the service is "casual." The length of service
of any one person is not material.85 In computing total hours, service
performed by all individuals must be included even though some are
exempted or are not technically employees. Thus services performed
by a child under 21 in the employ of his father, although exempt, must
be included in the total hours of labor on the project.
The interpretation of the phrase "not in the course of employer's
trade or business" is determined by two tests. First, the employer must
be engaged in a trade or business; and second, the services must pro-
mote or advance the employer's trade or business.86
Thus, service performed in the employ of a political candidate does
not constitute service in the course of a trade or business. Candidacy
is not a business carried on for profit but is only preparatory to the
deriving of income from a subsequent holding of office, if elected.S7
The Bureau has ruled that "extra-help" does not meet the second
test, for although "casual," it is in the course of the employer's trade
or business and hence not exempt.8s Similarly an employee hired to
save goods after a fire was employed in the course of the employer's
trade or business.0 9 Also building a barn,0  levelling ground in corrals,9'
digging a pit for platform scales,92 and carpentry work for cottages
occupied by ranch employees 93 are services not within the exception.
83 In one case the fact that there was an interval of 25 days between
the first period of the employment and the remainder was deemed
immaterial. Soc. Sec. Ed. Memorandum, Oct. 12, 1938, at 13.
8 "The phrase 'particular job or project' applies to the entire job
such as the construction of a house and not to the integral jobs
thereof, such as those performed by carpenters, bricklayers, masons,
etc." Soc. Sec. Ed., Claims Manual (1940) § 1203 (c).
8siIf the presumption raised by either of the two rules indicates that
the service is to be included within "employment," the service
should not be treated as excepted until the employer is advised in
writing by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (or, presumably,
the Board) that the presumption has been rebutted. This is true
even though under the other rule the service is presumptively casual.
86U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.210; Soc. Sec. Ed. Reg. 3, §403.810.
8 S. S. T. 312, 1938-2 cuIs. BULL. 309.
sSee note 74 supra.
09 Soc. Sec. Ed. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 1. Cleaning up a new
building into which the employer thereafter moved his food store,
also, is not excepted. Id. at 6.
Do Soc. Sec. Ed. Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1938, at 3. Also building a
tobacco barn. Id. at 8.
OI Id. at 15.
92 Ibid.
03 Id. at 11.
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The Supreme Court of Maine in an Unemployment Compensation case
held that contracting for repairs and alterations to real estate acquired
by a Savings Bank by foreclosure was not contracting for work which
was a part of the bank's usual trade or business. 9 4
Considering the reasons for the Social Security Act, and for this
provision "not in the course of the employer's trade or business," it
would seem that any activity which can be conveniently handled under
the present administrative machinery and which in any way promotes
or furthers the employer's trade or business should be included in
"employment."
AGRICULTURAL LABOR
The original Social Security Act exempted "agricultural labor"
without any definition of the term.95 The committee report gave
administrative difficulties as a reason for the exemption.96 The diffi-
culties alleged were: the territorial expanse of the United States; the
seasonal character of the industry; the high degree of mobility of the
workers; and the problem of records when cash wages are only a part
of the remuneration. Other important factors were the large number
of farm operators, unpaid family workers, and share croppers.97
The regulations of both the Treasury Department and the Social
Security Board,9 8 however, distinguished agricultural services more by
the nature of the service, than by any test of administrative imprac-
ticability.9 9 Services exempted were of two types-those directly con-
nected with activities admittedly agricultural such as the cultivation
of the soil, raising and harvesting agricultural commodities, and those
performed in handling, packing, storing, and preparing in their raw
and natural state agricultural products. Services were limited to those
performed by an employee of the owner or tenant of the farm on which
the materials were produced, and then only if such services were carried
94 Maine Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Maine Savings Banks, 136 Me.
136, 3 A. (2d) 897 (1937). Note that the test here was "usual
trade or business."
95 Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 620, 625, 639, 653 (1935) as amended
53 sTAT. 1373, 1400 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §409, 1011, 1107 (Supp.
1940).
DO SEN. REP. NO. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
97 Altmeyer, Social Security in Relation to Agricultural and Rural Areas,
3 SOC. SEC. BULL. NO. 7, at 3 (1940).
us Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 2, Art. 6 is practically identical with U. S.
Treas. Reg. 90, Art, 6, and Reg. 91, Art. 206 (1).
99 S. S. T. 55, XV-2 CUM. BULL. 416 (1936); S. S. T. 85, 1937-1 cum.
BULL. 393; S. S. T. 131 id. at 400; S. S. T. 118, id. at 397. This test
was inevitable to a considerable extent because of the statutory
basis of the exemption. The Bureau of Internal Revenue at first
held to a narrow interpretation of the term. S. S. T. 118, id. at
397; S. S. T. 131, id. at 400; S. S. T. 142, id. at 403; S. S. T. 158,
id. at 404; S. S. T. 166; id. at 406; S. S. T. 195, 1937-2 cura. BULL
408. But in S. S. T. 203, id. at 409, the Bureau reversed several
earlier rulings and considerably broadened the exemption. Later
rulings were in conformity with the new policy of broadening the
"agricultural labor" concept. S. S. T. 218, id. at 412; S. S. T. 219,
1937-2 id. at 412; S. S. T. 220, id. at 414; S. S. T. 231, id. at 417.
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on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from
manufacturing or commercial operation. 10O The term "farm" was used
in its ordinary sense.'01
From its experience the Social Security Board recommended to
Congress that the act be extended to cover large scale farming opera-
tions.102 Despite this recommendation, the Social Security Act Amend-
ment of 1939 not only retained the exemption but broadened it to include
services which under the ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue had
been considered taxable employment.103 This e-tension was justified in
the committee report on grounds that it had been difficult to "delimit
the application of the term with the certainty required for administra-
tion and for general understanding by employers and employees af-
fected."04
Thus to the exempted services performed on a farm, were added
services performed in connection with the operation, management, con-
servation, improvement, and maintenance of the farm if the major part
of these services are performed on a farm.10 5 Some of the services
constituted employment under the original act under some circumstances,
but not under others.10 6 The term farm was extended to include fur-
bearing animal farms, nurseries, and greenhouses and other similar
structures used primarily for the raising of agricultural commodities.
Greenhouses and other similar structures used primarily for other pur-
poses (e.g., displays and fabrication of wreaths and corsages) do not
constitute farms.'0 7 Services performed in connection with certain
operations l os which were held taxable as employment under the original
100 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 2, Art. 6.
101 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 2, Art. 6. The term included stock, dairy, poultry,
fruit and truck farms; plantations; ranches; ranges; and orchards.
Forestry and lumbering were not included within the exemption.
102 REP. SOC. SEC. BD. (1939). The Board states, "The Board believes that
. the inclusion of large scale farming operations, often of a
semi-industrial character, probably would reduce rather than in-
crease administration difficulties .... .
103 Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd. Oct. 8, 1940. H. R. REP. NO. 728,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). Cf. U. S. v. Turner Co., 111 F. (2d)
400 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).104H. R. REP. NO. '728, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939).
10 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3 §403.808 (c). Under this language services
which are not directly concerned with the cultivation of soil, etc.,
may be exempted as agricultural labor, as for example, services
performed by carpenters, painters, and bookkeepers which con-
tribute to the proper conduct of the farms. Also in this group are
services performed in salvaging timber or clearing land of brush
and other debris left by hurricane.
106 S. S. T. 125, 1937-1 cumi. BULL. 397.
107 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3 §403.808 (b).
'10 These services include the ginning of cotton, the hatching of poultry,
the raising or harvesting of mushrooms, the operation or main-
tenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways used exclusively
for supplying or storing water for farming purposes, the pro-
duction or harvesting of maple sap, or the processing of maple sap
into maple syrup or sugar, or the production of crude (oleoresin)
from a living tree or the processing such crude gum into gum
spirits of turpentine and gum rosin, provided such processing is
carried on by the original producer of such crude gum.
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Act are exempted in the amendment because ordinarily the services are
performed on a farm or are of such a character as to warrant no dif-
ferent treatment. 0 9 In order to come within the exemption these
services must be rendered directly in connection with one of the opera-
tions named. Mere connection with the business of which the operation
is a part is not enough. Thus, a bookkeeper of a company engaged in
ginning cotton would not be performing services in connection with the
ginning of cotton." 0
The amendment widened the scope of processing and handling
activities which came under the original exception. Services performed
in the handling and processing 1l of any agricultural commodity, other
than fruits and vegetables, are exempted as agricultural labor if such
services are performed as an incident to ordinary farming operations.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue defines such services as services in-
cidental to ordinary farming operations if performed by an employee of
a farmer or farmers' cooperative organization in connection with com-
modities produced by the farmer or farmers' group, and if they are
services of the character ordinarily performed by the employees of a
farmer or farmers' cooperative organization in the unmanufactured
state of such commodities.1 2 Factors indicating that particular opera-
tions are carried on as incidental are: (1) the same employees who
engage in admittedly agricultural activities also perform services in
the handling of farm products; (2) the equipment used and the methods
employed in handling the farm products are dissimilar to the equipment
and methods used in similar commercial or manufacturing operations;
(3) the employer handles products produced on his own farm exclusive-
ly; (4) the place of handling is located on the farm; (5) the product
handled is sold exclusively at wholesale; (6) it is the general custom
and practice to perform the handling operations in question; (7) the
capital invested in the handling equipment does not constitute the
greater part of the investment in the enterprise as a whole.11 These
factors are not conclusive, but assist in determining whether the service
is carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations or whether
it is a part of manufacturing or commercial operations.
Similar services performed in connection with fruits and vegetables
may be exempt whether performed in the employ of a farmer, farmers'
cooperative, or a commercial handler even though not performed as an
incident to ordinary farming operations, provided they are rendered
as an incident to the preparation of fruits and vegetables for market. 1 4
Services performed in connection with commercial canning or freezing
or in connection with any agricultural commodity after its delivery to a
terminal market for distribution for consumption are not agricultural
109 H. R. REP. NO. 728, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939).
11o S. S. T. 394, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 28 (1940).
"'1 This includes handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, process-
ing, freezing, grading, storing, or delivering to storage or to mar-
ket or to a carrier for transportation to market of agricultural
commodities.
112 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106 §402.208 (e).
"13 S. S. T. 125, 1937-1 cum. BULL. 397.
34 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106 §402.208 (e).
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labor. Since these services must be rendered in the actual handling of
the commodity, office employees are exempt.
Agricultural labor, as now defined, clearly includes persons who
are working under industrial conditions where the administrative dif-
ficulties mentioned above do not apply.115 The class of workers
involved are as much in need of coverage as those receiving benefits."6a
Thus, several bills have been introduced in Congress to limit the agri-
cultural exemption." 7 In view of the position of the Social Security
Board, the agitation of exempted employees, and the fact that other
countries have devised coverage for agricultural labor," s it is not un-
likely that the Act may in the future include these services.
DOMESTIC SERVICE
Domestic service is restricted to service in a private home, local
college club, or local chapter of a college fraternity or sorority.119 The
regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue'120 and of the Social
Security Boardl2l provide that domestic service means "services of a
household nature." This phrase in turn is defined as those services
which are ordinarily and customarily performed as an integral part
of household or home duties. 22 For this reason a resident "handy-man"
employed on a full-time basis who performed such services as firing the
furnace, washing windows, and mending furniture was held by the
Bureau to come within "domestic service."'. 23 Likewise, such services
as planting flowers and cutting grass performed by an applicant around
the residence of three different employers comes within the exception. 24
However, services not customarily a part of household duties or which
involve the use of skilled or specialized training are not exempted. 25
Hence, a bookbinder, 26 a museum assistant, 2 7 and a social secre-
tary128 were held not to be domestic service. Similarly, the Board held
that services performed by an odd-job man in building a rock wall and
15 47 AM. FEDERATIONIST NO. 2 at 15 (1940); Altmeyer, Soc. Sec. in
Relation to Agric. and Rural Areas, 3 SOC. SEC. BULL. NO. 7 at 3
(1940).
116 Ibid.
,117 47 AmERmAN FEDERATIONIST NO. 2 at 15 (1940).
UP Blaisdell, Old-Age Insurance for Agricultural Workers in Western
Europe, 1 SOC. SEC. BULL. NO. 4 at 19 (1938).
21149 STAT. 622 (1935) as amended 53 Stat. 1400 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A.
§409b (2), 1011 (2) (Supp. 1940).
120 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.209.
121 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.809.
122 Typical examples of services of a household nature are services
rendered by cooks, maids, butlers, laundresses, gardeners and
chauffeurs.
123 S. S. T. 242, 1937-2 CuM. BULL. 420.
124 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 13, 1938, at 12.
126 S. S. T. 242, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 420.
120 Id. at 421.
127 Id. at 420.
129 Id. at 421.
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a patio,129 and those performed by a laborer grading a road on the
private estate of his employerao were services in a covered employment,
and hence taxable.131
A "private home" as stated in the Act is defined by the regulations
as a "fixed place of abode of an individual or family."' 32 A home used
primarily as a business enterprise open to the public is not a private
home within this exception.1 33 A caretaker of an apartment, 3 4 a
gardener of a nursing home, 35 and a cook in a private boarding house' 30
are not, therefore, excluded from the Act. 37 Services performed in
the home of a deceased employer during the administration of the
estate constitute domestic service only if the house is maintained as a
private home for the decedents family. If the home is merely held by
the estate pending the distribution of the property, services in con-
nection with the care and maintainence of the house do not come within
this exception.'3 8
For the most part the regulations discussed above are applicable
to local college clubs and local chapters of a college fraternity or
sorority.3 9 Domestic service for such organizations are those house-
hold services that are ordinarily performed in such clubs. Waiters
and housemothers, therefore, come within the exception as well as
those services mentioned before.1 4o But if the club rooms or chapter
houses are used primarily for supplying board or lodging to the public
as a business enterprise, services performed therein are not within
this exception. To qualify as a college club or fraternity the member-
ship must be limited to individuals enrolled in or directly connected
with the university. Thus a women's club open not only to students,
faculty members, and administrative employees, but also to alumni,
former faculty members and their families was held to be within the
Act.141
129 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 13, 1938, at 5.
130 Ibid.
131 A resident carpenter and a resident painter employed on a full
time basis for repairing and maintaining a private home, S. S. T.
242, 1937-2 cUM. BULL. 421; Soc. See. Bd., Claims Manual (1940)
§1202a, and a carpenter building a private home for his employer,
Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 13, 1938, at 6, are not excepted.
132 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106,§402.209; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.809.
133 S. S. T. 174, 1937-2 CUM. BULL. 418; Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual
(1940) §1202b.
134 Soc. Sec. Bd. Memorandum, Oct. 13, 1938, at 1.
'8 Id. at 4.
lO Id. at 6.
137 Other persons not exempted were a maid in a hotel, Soc. Sec. Bd.
Memorandum, Oct. 13, 1938, at 6 and a yard man for tourist
homes, Id. at 7.
138 S. S. T. 121, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 406.
139 Service in a local college club or local chapter of a college fraternity
or sorority was not exempted under the 1935 Act. S. S. T. 76, id. at
366. The 1939 Amendment, however, expressly exempted such
service.
140 U. S. Treas. Reg. 106, §402.209; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.809.
141 S. S. T. 407, INT. REV. BULL. NO. 49, at 8 (1940).
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Exempted services must be both domestic and be performed in a
private home or local college club. If both elements are not present
such services are not exempted. For this reason a cook on a "dude
ranch" although clearly performing "domestic services" was held to be
in covered employment. 142
EMPLOYMENT COVERED BY THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT
The Social Security Board faces an important problem of co-
operation with the Railroad Retirement Board. The jurisdictions of
the two agencies are contiguous but the Social Security Act does not
include those services covered by the Railroad Retirement Act.143  At
present, coordination between the two Boards has been made difficult
because of vital differences in legal opinion of the two agencies.
The process of identifying covered service under the Retirement
Act is predominantly a process of identifying the "employer" as defined
by that Act.' 44 The Retirement Board has classified "employers" into
four groups. 45
Carriers by Railroad: A company is a carrier by railroad146 if it
meets all of the following requirements: (1) carriage of freight or
passengers; (2) carriage over tracks; (3) offer of carriage to the
general public; (4) carriage in interstate commerce; (5) carriage
within the confines of the United States, Alaska, or Hawaii; (6) and not
owned and operated by the United States.14
142 S. S. T. 174, 1937-2 cum. BULL. 418.
'4s53SA.17(13)42USCA 49b(9(up.14; 50 STAT.
317 193); 5 U..C.. §28(q (Spp.1940. Te poblem. is
lects taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 53 sTAT.1387 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §1601(a), and the Carriers' Taxing Act,
54 STAT.-(Aug. 13, 1940), 45 U.S.C.A. §261 (Supp. 1940), and
while in legal theory there is no connection between benefits pay-
able under Social Security and taxes collectible under the Contri-
butions Act or between benefits payable under Railroad Retirement
and taxes collectible under the Carriers' Act, in the public mind
they are quite naturally linked together in a general scheme of
social insurance. The harmonizing of the decisions of both Boards
with each other, and of each Board with the Bureau, and of the
Retirement Board with those under the Railway Labor Act 54 STAT.-.
(Aug. 13, 1940), 45 U.S.C.A. §151 (Supp. 1940), the Railroad Un-
employment Insurance Act, ibid., 45 U.S.C.A. §351 (Supp. 1940),
and the Carriers' Taxing Act, which have identical coverage pro-
visions, has proved a delicate task.
'"Ibid., 45 U.S.C.A. §228a (Supp. 1940). See also Regulations under
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 4 FED. BEG. 1477, (1939).
'" Much of this material have been taken from the ANNUAL REPORTS
OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARtD for 1938, 1939, and 1940 and
from the RETIREMIENT BOARD LAW BULLETIN, December, 1939;
other material is taken from 0inions of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd.,
October 23, 1940 and December 19, 1940.
14854 STAT.-(Aug. 13, 1940) ,45 U.S.C.A. §288a (Supp. 1940). "The
term 'employer means any carrier (including an express company,
sleeping-car company, or carrier by railroad, subject to Chapter 1
of Title 49)."
1 "Carriers by railroad," it will be noted, are simply those subject,
as such, t part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, 41 sTAT. 474,
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Electric railways involve special consideration, since they are
exempted if predominantly local in character.148 In order to be an
"employer", an electric railroad must not only come within part I of
the Interstate Commerce Act as a carrier by railroad,149 but also it
must be more than a street, interurban or suburban railway,150 or be a
part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation, as used in a
national sense. 151. The principles by which to determine whether an
electric railway is exempt are well-established;152 at least there is no
conflict on this point between the two Boards.
Railroad Associations and Labor Organizations: The second and
third general types of "employer" under the Act consist of (1) rail-
road associations which are engaged in services of that phase of trans-
portation which may be generally described as that which carriers
cooperatively perform for their mutual benefit; 153 and (2) railroad
labor organizations 54 national in scope and organized in accordance
with the Railway Labor Act. In the former case, although the facts
may be difficult to ascertain, the control and maintenance by the car-
rier, or lack of it, is usually apparent. Labor organizations under the
Act present no great problem.
Carrier Affiliates: The fourth class includes, in the words of the
Retirement Board, those employers "who function as an integral part
of railroad transportation but who are not directly responsible for the
discharge of the obligation to carry for the public, and who, accordingly
are not included in the regulation of obligations to shippers."'155 To
determine if a company falls within this class, it is necessary to
(1920) 49 U.S.C. §1 (1934), and problems hereunder are fairly
simple in the light of the facts and previous decisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
148 54 sTAT.-(Aug. 13, 1940), 45 U.S.C.A. §228a (Supp. 1940).
149 See note 147 supra.
150 Texas Electric Ry., 208 I.C.C. 193, (1935) pet. for reconsideration
denied, May 13, 1935, denial sustained Texas Electric Ry. v. Eastus,
25 F. Supp. 825 (1938), aff'd, 308 U.S. 512 (1940) ; Rules for Test-
ing Other Than Steam Locomotives, 122 I.C.C. 414 (1927); Hudson
and M. R. Co. v. Hardy, 103 F. (2d) 327 (1939), cert. denied, 307
U.S. 640 (1939), enunciate the principles.
'" Indiana Railroad, 229 I.C.C. 48 (1938); Chicago N.S. and M. R. R.,
234 I.C.C.13 (1939) ; Cincinnati and L. E. Ry., 229 I.C.C. 187 (1938);
Cincinnati and L. E. R. Co., 232 I.C.C. 267 (1939).
152 Other leading cases are Shields v. Utah Idaho C. R. R., 305 U.S.
177 (1938); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 299
(1932); Chicago S.S. & S.B. R. R. v. Fleming, 109 F. (2d) 419(1940). Of special recent significance are Denver & Intermountain
R. R., 237 I.C.C. 641 (1940); San Francisco & N.V.R.R., 237 I.C.C.
675 (1940); and Portland Traction Co., 237 I.C.C. 647 (1940).
253 54 STAT,-(Aug. 13, 1940), 45 U.S.C.A. §228a (Supp. 1940), "traffic
associations, tariff bureaus, demurrage bureaus, weighing and in-
spection bureaus, collection agencies and other associations, bureaus,
agencies, or organizations controlled and maintained wholly or
principally by two or more employers as hereinbefore defined and
engaged in the performance of services in connection with or inci-
dental to railroad transportation."
'5' Ibid.
255 (1938) ANNUAL REP., RAI0AD RETIREMENT BD., C. X., p. 149.
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determine whether the company is controlled by or under common con-
trol with a carrier. Control exists wherever one or more carriers have
the right or power by any means, irrespective of stock ownership, to
direct the policies of a company, and in any case in which a carrier
is in fact exercising the direction of the policies and business of a
company. Control has generally been predicated upon control of the
majority of voting securities, or where there are none, a majority of
the governing body of the company. In three exceptions, all involving
hospital associations, control was found to exist on the basis of three
factors: large carrier minority representation on the associations gov-
erning body; carrier domination of the officer-management; and a sub-
stantial dependence upon the carrier for financial contribution, either
in money or valuable property and services. 156
When control is established, it must be determined whether the
company performs services "in connection with" transportation which
will bring it within the Act. It is here that the divergence in legal
opinion of the Social Security and Retirement Boards is found. The
Retirement Board takes the position that this provision is more in-
clusive -ian "transportation" as defined by section 1(3) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act; the Social Security Board, on the other hand,
is of the opinion that section 1(a) as to carrier affiliates in the Re-
tirement Act was not intended to include more than those companies
engaged in "transportation" under section 1(3) of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
On the classification of some companies as carrier affiliates, there
is no dispute between the two agencies. Where the controlled company
is subject to section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act as determined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission,157 both Boards agree that it is
covered by the Retirement Act. Likewise services "in connection with
the receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, or
icing, storage, or handling of property transported by railroad" are
under the Retirement Act. 5s
Thereafter, legal opinion differs. The Retirement Board has
gone beyond section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act in defining
service "in connection with transportation." Any service "reasonably
related directly, functionally or economically, to the performance of
railroad common-carrier obligations" is held covered by the Retirement
O Recently, the Board has found control to exist solely through con-
tracts which insured that operations of the company would be in
the interests of the carrier's employer. It is the fact of control
which is important, rather than the particular instrumentality
through which it is exercised. (1940) id. c. Xli, p. 179.
'
5 7 1n general, these are within the Act: operation of a freight
terminal for receipt and delivery of property transported by rail-
road; operation of a passenger station or terminal; switching cars
for a carrier; operation of stockyards for transfer of cattle to be
transported by railroad; and operation of a wharf for transfer of
shipments from railroad to water carrier.
103 In general, these are included: storage of property received for a
carrier and awaiting transfer by the carrier; operation of a grain
elevator for receipt of grain for transportation by railroad; icing
and refrigerating services which the carrier holds itself out to
perform for the public as part of its common carrier obligations.
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Act. Thus, the Retirement Board held that a car-works company,
engaged solely in the manufacture of equipment parts, was an "em-
ployer" performing service "in connection with transportation." In
that case the examiner's report stated that the performance of a service
was "not restricted to operation or services which constitute transporta-
tion or practically transportation;" and that "services in connection
with transportation;" although inclusive of transportation services
covered by section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, was not
limited to such transportation services.
Following the precedent of this case, the Retirement Board included
within its coverage: a coal company, supplying all of its coal to its
parent railroad company;15 9 a company which exclusively supplies water;
one exclusively supplying oil for fuel; one operating an eating-house
service for railroad passengers and employees; and a company main-
taining and operating a railroad office building. Later decisions in-
cluded a company which negotiates contracts for the furnishing of cars,
containers and other equipment to railroads; one maintained for the
purpose of acquiring and holding title to various properties of a rail-
road; and an athletic association operated to promote the welfare of a
railroad's employees. Even motorbus companies engaged in the trans-
portation of passengers may be "employers" under the carrier-affiliate
provision if its operations are "reasonably directly related, functionally
or economically," to the performance of railroad common-carrier obliga-
tions.160 Such a relationship is generally said to exist when the bus
company is substantially engaged in operations "coordinated" with
rail operations as, for example, when it performs service the dominant
objective of which is to permit abandonment of less profitable rail
operations, the extension of rail service, or the enlargement of rail
traffic. Likewise, water carriers may be "employers" under the Retire-
ment Act if they operate equipment or facilities or perform services
"in connection with railroad transportation."
Counsel for Social Security, on the other hand, contend that Congress
expressed an intention to confine this special system of insurance to the
"railroad industry;"''16 and that a company is not under the Retirement
Act unless it performs services constituting a part of "transportation" by
. After this holding, the Retirement Act was amended so that the Act
"shall not include any company by reason of its being engaged in
the mining of coal, the supplying of coal to an employer where
delivery is not beyond the mine tipple." 54 STAT.-(Aug. 13, 1940),
45 U.S.C.A. 228a (Supp. 1940).
160 With respect to motor transportation, it should be borne in mind
that bus and trucking companies are subject to Part I of the Inter-
state Commerce Act only to the extent that they perform railroad
terminal services as distinguished from line-haul service. 91 I.C.C.
539 (1924); 182 I.C.C. 263 (1932); 206 I.C.C. 436 (1935); 218
I.C.C. 441, 471 (1936).1 861 H. R. REP. NO. 2668, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 1 (R. R. Unem-
ployment Insurance Act); SEN. REP. NO. 1363, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935)2 (Railroad Retirement Act); SEN. REP. NO. 697, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937)2 (Railroad Retirement Act of 1937); Hearings
before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 8652, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 6, 9. (testimony of Congressman Crosser on Car-
riers Taxing Act of 1938).
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railroad, i.e. a common carrier by railroad as defined by the Interstate
Commerce Act.162 Similarly they assert that the phrase "in connection
with" transportation, by comparison with other transportation statutes
using the same phrase, means "a necessary part of the actual rail
transportatin."163 Further, they contend that the coverage provision
is so similar to the one in the Railway Labor Act, the original draft of
which ex\ pressly stated that the terms were used as defined in the
Interstate Commerce Act,1 64 that there was no intent to broaden the
coverage.165
The Social Security Board has taken the position that a steamship
company, operating port-to-port, owned by a railroad, participating in
through routes and joint rates with its parent and other railroads, and
transshipping freight to and from the railroads with which it makes
connections, was not an "employer" under the Retirement Act. The
Retirement Board previously had held that it was.
Following this precedent, the Social Security Board later held that
a painter employed by a bus company owned by a railroad, was an
"employee" under the Social Security Act because the bus company
was not subject to section 1(a) of the Retirement Act.1 66
The intent of Congress was to confine the scope of the Railroad
Retirement act to "railroads" and "transportation" as defined in the
Interstate Commerce Act. The Railroad Retirement Board advances
two reasons for its broader coverage: first, it prevents exclusion of
162 See note 160 supra. That the Railway Labor Act, from which the
Railroad Retirement Coverage provision was taken, was not intended
to broaden this coverage as to motor transportation, see Hearings
before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
7650, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1933) 20; see also id. H. R. 6956, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., (1937) 134; id. S. 2S95, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1937) 12-13.
163 Section 1, INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 24 STAT. 379; 30 STAT. 424; 38
STAT. 103; 39 STAT. 412, 425; 35 STAT. 584; Sections 1 (5), 6(7), and
15(13), INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT; Lehigh Valley R.R. v. U. S.
243 U. S. 444 (1917); I.C.C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42 (1911);
U. S. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 231 U. S. 274 (1913); Warehouse
Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 501 (1931). In a subsequent part of the
"employer" definition, 45 U. S. C. A. §228a it is provided that
employer shall include certain organizations "engaged in the per-
formance of services in connection with or incidental to railroad
transportation." The omission from the earlier part of "incidental
to" indicates that "in connection with" was not to be so construed.
164 Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Sen. 3266, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1933) 10-11.
265 Id., at 11,57-58, 145-146; Hearings before Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1933)
17-18.
106 See note 160 supra. "Trucking service" is a specific stautory excep-
tion in the carrier-affiliate provision; and the Retirement Board has
not yet held any company engaged exclusively in trucking operations
to be an employer under the "carrier by railroad" provision. It
may yet do so, however, in view of the remarks in Scott Bros., Inc.,
4 M. C. C. 551 (1938), that a pickup and delivery trucking service
for a railroad within a railroad terminal area might be a carrier
by railroad subject to part I of the Interstate Commerce Act. SEE
(1939) ANNUAL REP., RAILROAD RETIREMENT BD., C. IX, p. 168.
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entities legally distinct from the carrier though performing functions
"intimately associated" with transportation; second, it protects the
covered field from excision of its parts through devices calculated to
avoid employer obligations. These reasons may be questioned because
they assume that which they purport to prove, i.e., that the entities are
"intimately associated" with transportation or that they are "parts"
of the covered field. Moreover, pertinent as these considerations may
have been in other matters (e.g., assumption of federal control during the
World War, and permission to the parent to guarantee bonds of the
subsidiary) they are not shown to have any bearing on the proper
allocation of a company for purposes of social insurance. A subsidiary
does not escape its "employer obligations" by falling without the pro-
visions of the Retirement Act, but simply owes those obligations to a
different governmental agency, which was also constituted to accomplish
the general scheme of social insurance. The basis for the extended
coverage has been the words "in connction with," and the extension was
made in the face of settled interpretations of the same words as used
in other federal statutes dealing with transportation. 167
Aside from the above considerations, uniform interpretation of
section I (a) of the Retirement Act and section 1(3) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, would achieve certainty and clarity in the application
of the several acts involved. It may be that such a result can only be
reached by additional amendments establishing the lines of coverage.168
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
Service in the employ of government instrumentalities is exempt.169
This exemption was included largely because of constitutional limitations
on the taxing power.'7o Thus it would seem that the term "instru-
mentality"71 should include only those persons or organizations that
cannot be taxed constitutionally.
167"If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a
more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common
practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when
we come to interpret a statute." Boston Sand Co. v. United States,
278 U. S. 41, 48 (1928).
168 This was done previously when the Retirement Board included coal
companies. See note 159 supra.
169 The exception in the 1935 act includes instrumentalities of the Fed-
eral government, a state or states, and political subdivisions thereof.
49 STAT. 622 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§410 (5) (6), 1011 (6) (7)
(Supp. 1940).
170 Stevens, Coverage of the Old Age Benefit Provisions of the Social
Security Act (Unpublished thesis in University of Michigan Law
Library 1939) at 43.
17 This discussion is limited to government instrumentalities. Whether
a person is an employee of the Federal or State government is
purely a problem of the employment relation and is discussed p. 495
supra. Also whether a district is a political subdivision of a State
is dependent in every case by the statutory and constitutional pro-
visions creating the district and is determined by the law of that
particular state. Due to the relative unimportance of the problem,
it is not considered here. For Bureau of Internal Revenue de-
cisions on this question see: S. S. T. 159, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 430;
S. S. T. 98, id. at 416; S. S. T. 94, id. at 415
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The Bureau of Internal Revenue, however, did not follow this
interpretation. Instead it ruled that if an organization acted for the
government and executed some governmental power it was exempt." 2
No distinction was made between so-called "governmental functions"
and "proprietary functions."'173 As long as the organization performed
or could be required to perform some function of government, even
though incidental to its business as a private enterprise, it was classi-
fied as a government instrumentality. 1" 4  Thus all national banks1 75
and state member banks of the Federal Reserve System176 are exempted
since they can be employed as fiscal agents of the Federal government.
Such decisions unnecessarily extended the scope of the exemptions
1 7
and are difficult to reconcile with the reason for the exceptions.
State courts, in interpreting unemployment compensation statutes,
refused to follow this interpretation. 178 Their decisions held that the
term "government instrumentality" was not applicable to a private
corporation existing primarily for profit even though it was granted
certain incidental duties and privileges by the government."79
The Social Security Board likewise extended the exception. Al-
though national banks 80 and state member banks of the Federal Re-
serve System's' were evidently exempted from the Act, the Board dis-
tinguished between "banking functions" and the banks activities as a
trustee in managing private property for another. 8 2 Thus a janitor
172 S. S. T. 43, XV-2 CUM. BULL. 387 (1936); Bridewell, Liability of
Ass'ns for Unemployment Comp. (1940) 6 John Marshall L. Q. No.
1, at 54.
"73U. S. Treas. Reg. 90, Art. 206 (5), 206 (6).
17 Whether the organization was wholly owned or controlled by the
government, whether it was engaged primarily in a public function
or for private benefit, or whether the tax would impose an economic
burden on the government were evidently deemed immaterial.
S. S. T. 44, XV-2 cuM. BULL. 388 (1936); Bridewell, supra note 172,
at 59.
175 S. S. T. 16, XV-2 cum. BULL. 386 (1936).
170 S. S. T. 44, id. at 388. The same result was reached as to state
building and loan associations, savings banks, etc. members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System. S. S. T. 109, 1937-1 cum. BULL.
421.
77 This is a broader taxation immunity than given for other types of
taxes. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
178 State bank, member of the Federal Reserve System not instrument-
ality: Western Bank and Trust Co. v. Atkinson, 9 L. W. 349 (Ohio
1940); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Hines, 8 L. W. 76 (Pa.
1940); state building and loan association and savings bank, mem-
ber of Federal Home Loan Bank System not instrumentality:
Metropolitan Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Tex. Unemp. Comp. Com., 139
S. W. (2) 309 (Tex. 1940), cert. denied, 61 S. Ct. 140 (1940);
Waterbury Savings Bank v. Donoher, 9 L. W. 2334 (Conn. 1940);
Capital Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Kan. Comm'n. of Labor & Industry,
148 Kan. 446, 83 P. (2d) 106 (1938).
170Unemployment Comp. Com. v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co., 215
N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2) 584 (1939).
180 Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., Sept. 10, 1938.
18, Id.
282 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §1205e.
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employed in buildings owned by a national bank as trustee for the
benefit of creditors was held to be within the benefit provisions of the
Act even though he had been exempted from the taxing provisions.1 83
Furthermore, the Board points out that the mere fact an organization
is designated a fiscal agent of the government does not necessarily
make it a government instrumentality.18 4
The 1939 amendments limited the original exceptions. 185 Only
those organizations (1) wholly owned by the federal or state govern-
ments, (2) exempt from taxation by other provision of law, or (3)
immune under the Constitution were exempted.186 Thus national banks
and state member banks of the Federal Reserve System are no longer
excepted from the Act.18 7 The amendment is more in conformity with
the general purposes of the Act and simplifies to a great extent the
problems caused by the original non-definitive exemptions.
Except for the cases mentioned above the amendment did not other-
wise change materially the ruling of the Bureau 188 under the original
Act. The many banking and other similar corporations created by the
Federal Government were previously held within the exception and they
remained so under 1939 amendments.189 State banks, building and
loan associations, savings and loan associations and the like whose
accounts were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 19o
or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Association' 91 were never
exempted.192
188 Opinion of Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., Sept. 10, 1938. However a mill
purchased by a national bank at a receivers sale and operated by
the bank for its own benefit was exempt from the Act. Opinion
of Counsel. Soc. Sec. Bd.
1841d. Feb. 27, 1941. Also a state savings and loan association termed
a "lending agency" of the commodity credit corporation by the Act
creating the credit corporation is not exempt. The decision was
based on the fact that the credit corporation had no control over or
management of the state organization and that the association did
not in fact loan money as agent of the corporation. Opinion of Coun-
sel Soc. Sec. Bd., April 22, 1939.
IS' H. R. REP. NO. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess; SEN. R1IP. NO. 734, 76th Cong.
1st Sess. (1939).
18653 STAT. 1400 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) §§409b (6) and
(7), 1011 (6) and (7).
187 Mim. 5003, 1940-1 cum. BULL. 203. Also state organizations members
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Id. at 208.
288 Most of the remaining discussion is from decisions and rulings of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
189For example: Federal Home Loan Banks; Federal Land Banks;
Joint Stock Land Banks; Central Bank for Cooperatives; and Home
Owners Loan Corporation. Compare S. S. T. 61, 1937-1 CUM. BULL.
409 and S. S. T. 62, ibid. with Mim. 5003, 1940-1 cum. BULL. 203;
Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) 1205b. In at least one case,
however, the reason for exempting the corporation had to be modi-
fied. Compare S. S. T. 140, 1937-1 cuM. BULL. 428 with MinL 5003,
1940-1 CUM. BULL. 203.
190 S. S. T. 79, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 411.
191 S. S. T. 115, id. at 424.
1
9 2 Nor was the fact that a state bank was a depository for postal sav-
ings funds sufficient to make it an instrumentality. S. S. T. 126,
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A private contractor engaged in the performance of contracts in
connection with Federal Relief activities is not an instrumentality of
the United States.1 93 Likewise, the exemption does not include persons
working directly for or under a contract with the government, 94 i.e.
carrying the mail,9 5 constructing a building,96 or operating a federal
reclamation project.19 7
Even under the original Act, the Bureau included as many state
created organizations as possible. Of course, if the service performed is
some direct function of the state, whether governmental or proprietary,
the service is exempt; 198 but a state created organization to foster
a particular activity even though it benefits the whole State is not
exempt. And this is true even though the State supervises, controls,
and finances it. 99
The same interpretation is applied to organizations created by
counties and municipalities.- Hence a county tuberculosis camp was
1937-1 CUm. BULL. 425. Also a clearing house association, S. S. T.
101,Id., at 418, and a Safe Deposit Company, S. S. T. 108, id. at
420, created and owned by state banks members of the Federal Re-
serve System were not classified as government instrumentalities.
193 S. S. T. 26 XV-2 CUM. BULL. 414 (1936); S. S. T. 14, id. at 398.
10-'The Social Security Board'has a like ruling. Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims
Manual (1940) §1205 (d). The U. S. Supreme Court held a private
corporation operating a bathhouse on land leased from the Sec-
retary of Interior within a Government Reservation and subject to
regulations of the Federal Government was not a government in-
strumentality within the Arkansas Unemployment Compensation
Act. Buckstaff Bathhouse Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358 (1940).
The Bureau has reached similar results as to operators of conces-
sions in national parks, S. S. T. 31, XV-2 cum. BULL. 400 (1936)
and services performed in the employ of a lessee of restricted
Indian Lands, S. S. T. 175, 1937-2 CU\. BULL. 435. Army post
exchanges are instrumentalities of the United States even under
the 1939 amendments. S. S. T. 385, 1940-1 cUM. BULL. 292.
1- S. S. T. 205, 1937-2 cuA. BULL. 438.
109 S. S. T. 412, INT. REV. BULL NO. 11, at 5 (1941).
197 S. S. T. 38, XV-2 cum. BULL 400 (1936). Somewhat comparable to
this decision is a Social Security Board opinion that a water users
Association formed mainly for the purpose of facilitating dealings
between the Secretary of the Interior and the water users of a
federal reclamation project was not an instrumentality of the
United States before the 1939 amendment. Opinion of the Soc. See.
Bd., Feb. 27, 1941.
198 S. S. T. 228, 1937-2 cuM. BULL. 444 (state motor vehicle agents ap-
pointed by Commissioner of Motor Vehicles); S. S. T. 200, id. at
437 (race track inspectors appointed by the State Racing Com-
mission); S. S. T. 171, id. at 433 (State Board of Law Examiners);
S. S. T. 100, 1937-1 cum. BULL. 418 (State Liquor Control Com-
mission and its employees). Cf. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. v. Welch,
25 F. Supp. 809 (D. C. 1939) (street railway taken over by State
appointed trustees having complete control over management and
operation not exempt).
199 S. S. T. 347, 1938-2 cu. BULL. 319 (horticultural society created,
partially supported, and regulated to a limited extent by the State
not exempt); S. S. T. 169, 1937-2 CUM. BULL. 432 (services perform-
ed for a private business during vocational training period, state
reimbursing employer for one-half of wages paid during such
period not exempt).
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exempted from the Act.20 o And a municipal league organized by a
group of municipalities and supported by taxation of member cities
was held to be an instrumentality of a political subdivision.201 A
municipally owned but privately operated gas plant, however, was held
not within the exeception.2O2
The present exceptions of government instrumentalities from the
Act seem to limit the exceptions as much as is constitutionally permis-
sible. A further limitation can come only by means of a narrowed tax
immunity of government instrumentalities.
Charles J. Barnhill
William M. Bloom
W. Daniel Bretz, Jr.
John R. Danch
SOCIAL SECURITY WAGE RECORDS
Three parties primarily are concerned -with Social Security wage
records-the employer, the employee, and the Social Security Board.1
Wages are defined as "all remuneration for employment, includ-
ing the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash." 2 Remuneration for services which do not constitute "employ-
ment" within the coverage of the Act is excluded from "wages." 3
Likewise, remuneration in excess of $3,000 paid in any one year is
exempt. Prior to the 1939 amendments the tax was assessed on the
wages up to $3,000 paid by each employer, even though the employee
had more than one employer during the year. After the 1939 amend-
ments, any amount in excess of $3,000 paid in any calendar year to
one employee, whether it was received from one or several employers,
is exempt.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary or unless they were
200 The camp was located on land deeded by a city and was supported
by county funds. S. S. T. 168, id. at 431.
201 The league assists the cities with finance and personnel problems
and serves as a fact finding body in connection with proposed legis-
lation affecting the municipalities. S. S. T. 211, 1937-2 cuI. BUL-
440. Also a company owned jointly by a city and county operating
ferries between cities in the State is within the exception. S. S. T.
74, 1937-1 cuM. BULL. 475.
202 S. S. T. 89, id. at 476. Municipally owned and operated lighting
plant, water works, and cemetery are within the exeception. S. S.
T. 2, XV-1 CUM. BULL. 473 (1936).
'While this although a system of account numbers and wage records
was not required by the original Act, the Social Security Board
immediately ordered such registration. The amended Act, 53
STAT. 1369 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §405 (Supp. 1940), makes
it the specific duty of the Board to establish and maintain rec-
ords of the amount of wages paid to each individual.
2 53 STAT. 1373 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. § 409 (Supp. 1940).
3 For a discussion of the meaning of "employment" see p. 495 supra.
